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Abstract—In this paper a new multiple access algorithm for
cognitive radio networks based on game theory is presented.
We address the problem of a multiple access system where the
number of users and their types are unknown. In order to do this,
the framework is modelled as a non-cooperative Poisson game in
which all the players are unaware of the total number of devices
participating (population uncertainty). We propose a scheme
where failed attempts to transmit (collisions) are penalized. In
terms of this, we calculate the optimum penalization in mixed
strategies. The proposed scheme conveys to a Nash equilibrium
where a maximum in the possible throughput is achieved.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cognitive Radio (CR) has recently emerged as a promis-
ing technology capable of taking advantage of wasted or
temporary unused radio spectrum bands and providing high
throughput to unlicensed users who transmit within such
bands. In this new communication paradigm, two types of
users are considered: Primary Users (PU) who are allowed to
access the channel at any moment, and Secondary or Cognitive
Users (SU). SUs can only access the channel under certain
circumstances (e.g. when the PU is not present) or under
specified power restrictions, such that the quality of service
(QoS) of the PU remains unaltered. It is well known that
the surrounding radio environment changes due to the random
nature of wireless channels, the dynamic topology and the
mobility of users. The SUs should be capable of observing
such changes, learning and taking decisions accordingly in
order to maximize their throughput. Within this context, SUs
can be considered as players competing for a specific license
band, resulting in different kinds of payoffs for them. Game
theory is a very powerful mathematical tool to model these
kind of situations where intelligent rational decision-makers
are competing for the same resource. This has been well
studied and applied to communication systems in several
scenarios [1] [2]. Due to the inherently competitive nature
of CR networks, game theory arises as a straightforward
approach to deal with several application problems where
the SUs can be modelled as the players in conflict (see for
instance [3]-[7] ). Specifically, the Medium Access Control
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(MAC) problem has been analyzed using game theory tools
in previous literature such as [1] [2] [8] [9]. In [9] a game
theory model is presented as a starting point for the Distributed
Coordination Function (DCF) mechanism in IEEE 802.11. In
the DCF there are no base stations or access points which
control the access to the channel, hence all nodes transmit their
data frames in a competitive manner. However, as pointed out
in [9], the proposed DCF game does not consider how the
different types of traffic can affect the sum throughput of the
system. Moreover, in [10] it is assumed that the total number
of players is known in order to evaluate the performance
of the DCF. On the other hand, in [8] a game-theoretic
model of multipacket slotted ALOHA with perfect information
is studied. The authors show that in this model, the Nash
equilibrium must exist and its stability region is characterized.
Furthermore, a pricing strategy based on slotted ALOHA with
multipacket reception is proposed in [11] in order to enforce
fairness among the players. In [12] the author calculates an
optimal access probability based on slotted ALOHA which
maximizes the successful delivery probability in CR networks.
Nonetheless, the author assumes that the number of transmit-
ters and receivers is always known during the analysis and
all users share a common access probability (i.e. all users are
treated equally.) In [13] a distributed MAC algorithm with
one-slot memory is proposed in order to coordinate the access
among the the secondary users and restrict interference to the
PU. An optimal probability of attempting to access the channel
for the SUs in order to maximize the throughput is obtained. A
p-persistent protocol to control the selection of the contention
window in the IEEE 802.11 backoff algorithm is described in
[14]. The authors had shown how to maximize the throughput
of the scheme. Notwithstanding, the authors in [13] and [14]
do not consider either the possibility of having different types
of users, nor the randomness in the number of SUs in the
system [15] [16] [17]. In contrast, this paper addresses the
problem similar to that approached by the Enhanced DCF
included in IEEE 802.11e [18], which is a natural extension
of the DCF mechanism. To be more specific, we provide
a different interpretation and analysis in order to solve the
problem of multiple access for a heterogenous and random
population of SUs, based on Myerson’s results for Poisson
games [19]. This branch of game theory analysis, addresses
the problem of games with an uncertain population, in other
2words, when the number of players1 is unknown and can be
modelled as a random variable.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II summarizes
the theoretical basis of Poisson Games and two multiple access
examples are given. Section III presents our novel Poisson
game model. We calculate the optimal mixed strategies and the
optimal penalizations used in the game. Section IV extends the
aforementioned analysis to the case of two types of SUs and
provides an accurate analytical approximation to the Pareto
frontier. In Section V the impact on the PU based on its activity
is considered and the optimal mixed strategies are calculated
accordingly. Finally some conclusions are drawn in Section
VI.
II. POISSON GAMES
In [19] it is established the concept of a Poisson Game as a
special case of a more general type of games called Random
Player Games. In games with population uncertainty [20] [21],
there is a nonempty finite set of players types T which is
known apriori. In the context of communications systems, this
set could contain the different types of services offered by the
network (voice, video, data, etc). There is also a finite set of
available choices or pure actions C that a player may take. For
instance, these could be all the different transmission powers
that the secondary user may utilize [22] or, in the context of
this paper, the decision to transmit or not. The set of possible
actions is the same regardless of the type of player. The main
characteristic of a Poisson Game is that the total number of
players of certain types, are modelled as random variables. In
this paper we use the definition given by Myerson [20] which
presents a Poisson Game Γ as the five-tuple (λ, T , r, C, u).
Here, the parameter λ corresponds to the mean number of
users described by a Poisson random variable with probability
mass function defined as
f(k) = e−λ
λk
k!
. (1)
Thus, the number of players in the game is a Poisson random
variable with average number of players2 λ >> 1. Each user
from the complete population belongs to one of the types
t ∈ T . The probability of a user to be of type t is given by
r(t) = Prob(type = t). This information is embedded in the
vector r ∈ ∆(T ) where ∆(·) represents the set of probability
distributions over T . By applying the decomposition property
[20] [23] of the Poisson distribution, we can establish that the
number of players in the game of type t is also a Poisson
random variable with parameter λr(t). On the other hand, it
is assumed that the set C of possible actions is common to
all the players regardless of their type. Thus, the set ∆(C)
is the set of mixed actions associated with the players. In
Poisson games, the utility of a specific player depends on its
type, the action he chooses, and on the number of players
1Throughout this paper the terms players and secondary users shall be used
interchangeably.
2It is important to remark that even though in the original paper of Myerson,
the value of λ is chosen to be very large, the validity of the results can be
applied here as long as a relatively large λ is used so that the probability of
having zero players in the Poisson game is negligible.
(not counting himself), who choose each possible action. The
number of players for each possible element in C is listed in
a vector called the action profile. Finally, the last term of the
tuple is the utility defined as u = (ut)t∈T where ut(a, x) is
the payoff that a player of type t receives when a pure action
a is chosen and the number of players who choose action b is
x(b), for all b ∈ C. Now, if the participants play in accordance
to the strategy σ, we call σt(a) the probability that a player
of type t chooses the pure action a. Using the decomposition
property again, we can establish that the number of players of
type t ∈ T who choose the pure action a is Poisson distributed
with mean λr(t)σt(a). Since the sum of independent Poisson
random variables is also a Poisson variable with mean equal
to the sum of the means, the total number of players who
take the pure action a is Poisson distributed with mean λτ(a),
where
τ(a) =
∑
t∈T
r(t)σt(a).
It follows that, a player of type t who plays a pure action
a ∈ C while the rest of the players are expected to play using
strategy σ has a expected utility of
Ut(a, σ) =
∑
x∈Z(C)
P (x|σ)ut(a, x), (2)
where,
P (x|σ) =
∏
b∈C
e−λτ(b)
(λτ(b))
x(b)
x(b)!
, (3)
while the expected utility whether the player chooses action
θ ∈ ∆(C) is
Ut(θ, σ) =
∑
a∈C
θ(a)Ut(a, σ). (4)
A. Nash Equilibrium in Poisson Games
It is very well known that a Nash equilibrium is achieved
when each strategy played by all players corresponds to the
best response to all other strategies in such equilibrium [3]
[24]. Consequently, no player has anything to gain by changing
his own strategy unilaterally. The set of best responses for a
player of type t against a strategy σ is the set of actions that
maximizes his expected utility given that the rest of the players
(including those whose type is t) play as prescribed by σ. Let
us define the set
Bt(σ) =
{
b ∈ C : b ∈ argmax
a∈C
Ut(a, σ)
}
(5)
as the set of pure best responses against σ for a player of type
t. Equally, the set for mixed best responses against σ is the
set of actions Bt(σ) = ∆(Bt(σ)). Therefore, the strategy σ∗
is a Nash equilibrium if σ∗t ∈ Bt(σ∗)∀t.
B. Examples and Motivation
a) Example 1: Let Γ be a Poisson game with λ = 15,
only one type of players, set of available choices C =
{ON,OFF}, and the utility function:
u(ON, x) =
{
R if x(ON) ≤ Kmax
0 otherwise ,
u(OFF, x) = 0 ∀x ∈ C,
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Fig. 1. Average utility for Poisson Game in Example 1 (λ = 15).
where Kmax is the maximum number of players that can
transmit at the same time beside one transmitting player with-
out causing a collision and R is the transmission rate payoff
when the player achieves a successful transmission. This game
follows the mixed strategies defined as σ(ON) = p and
σ(OFF ) = 1 − p where p is the probability of transmission
by any given player. Hence, using (4) we can calculate the
expected utility as
U(p) = R
Kmax+1∑
n=1
∞∑
i=n
n
i
(
i
n
)
pn(1− p)i−n
{
e−λ
λi
i!
}
= R
Kmax+1∑
n=1
pnλn [Γ(n+ 1)− nΓ(n,−λ(1− p))]
eλn!(−λ(1− p))n
.
(6)
The dependence of U(p) as a function of p is shown in Figure
1 for different values of Kmax. The solid line represents the
utility of the Poisson game and the dashed lines represent
the utility if this was a game with complete information (i.e.,
fixed number of players known for all). Considering the fact
that a Nash equilibrium predicts in a consistent manner the
way in which a game will be played, it is evident that in this
game there exists just one logical outcome. In other words, the
Nash equilibrium is strict, which by definition must occur in
non degenerate strategies [24]. The equilibrium occurs when
all players transmit all the time (p = 1). As noted in Figure
1, this conveys to a zero utility for all the users. This game
is designed in such way that the players have no motivation
to not transmit. It can be seen that the utilities obtained are
very far from the Pareto optimal3 which could be achieved
by playing a mixed strategy (p < 1). Figure 2 shows the
achievable utilities if the players were motivated to play Pareto
dominant strategies, and thus transmitting only a fraction of
time p < 1. Notice that by increasing the value of Kmax , the
3A Pareto Optimality is defined as a specific set of strategies in which no
player can change their strategy and have a greater utility without making any
other player utility worse.
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Fig. 2. Pareto Optimality Utilities for Example 1.
probability of transmission by a player increases along side
resulting in a higher utility. It is possible to deduce that as
Kmax tends to the maximum number of players known in a
game with complete information, the average utility converges
to 100%. At the same time, in a Poisson game, due to the
uncertainty on the number of players, the average utility does
not achieve the maximum when Kmax tends to λ. Thus, it is
important to consider the Poisson game in detail.
b) Example 2: Consider the Poisson game defined by
Γ = {λ, T , r, C, u}, with expected number of players λ = 15,
set of types T = {1, 2} with probabilities r1 and r2, r1+r2 =
1 respectively, set of choices C = {ON,OFF} and the utility
function:
u1(ON, x) =
{
R1 if x(ON) ≤ Kmax1
0 otherwise ,
u1(OFF, x) = 0 ∀x ∈ C,
u2(ON, x) =
{
R2 if x(ON) ≤ Kmax2
0 otherwise , (7)
u2(OFF, x) = 0 ∀x ∈ C,
where Kmax1 and Kmax2 are the maximum number of players
who can transmit simultaneously with type 1 and type 2
players respectively. Similarly to Example 1, R1 and R2 are
the achievable rates in case of a successful transmission. We
define the mixed strategies σ1(ON) = p1 and σ2(ON) = p2
as the transmission probabilities by type 1 and type 2 players
respectively. The expected utilities can be calculated by means
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of eqs. (2)-(4) as follows
U1(p1, p2) = R1
Kmax1+1∑
n=1
n∑
k=1
{
∞∑
i=k
k
i
(
i
k
)
pi1(1− p1)
i−k
×
[
e−r1λ
(r1λ)
i
i!
] ∞∑
j=n−k
(
j
n− k
)
pj2(1− p2)
j−n+k
×
[
e−r2λ
(r2λ)
j
j!
]}
,
U2(p1, p2) = R2
Kmax2+1∑
n=1
n∑
k=1
{
∞∑
i=k
k
i
(
i
k
)
pi2(1− p2)
i−k
×
[
e−r1λ
(r2λ)
i
i!
] ∞∑
j=n−k
(
j
n− k
)
pj1(1− p1)
j−n+k
×
[
e−r1λ
(r1λ)
j
j!
]}
.
(8)
Figure 3 shows the expected utility for this example. Since
again the players have no incentive to use mixed strategies,
the same strict Nash equilibrium occurs in which all players
transmit all the time (i.e. p1 = p2 = 1) resulting in zero utility
to all of them. Nevertheless, unlike Example 1, there exist
several Pareto dominant mixed strategies in terms of the pairs
of probabilities (p1, p2). Such a pairs form a Pareto frontier
which contains the set of all optimal strategies [24] [25]. In the
following section, we will reformulate the proposed Poisson
games in order to approach to the Pareto optimality.
III. SYSTEM MODEL AND CORRESPONDING GAME
Let us assume for a moment that there is a fixed and known
number N of SUs contending stations while the PU is in the
idle state. The transmission queue for all the SUs is assumed
to be always nonempty i.e. each user always has a packet
ready to be transmitted right after the completion of each
transmission. We consider that the system works in a slotted
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ON 
ON 
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Fig. 4. Strategic form of multiple access game (N = 2).
ALOHA fashion where each slot of the system is modelled as a
one-stage game. At the beginning of each slot, the players have
to choose between the two possible actions C ∈ {ON,OFF}
which represent their ability to transmit or to backoff. Every
time a player decides to transmit, he can either succeed, in
which case he gains throughput, or fail due to a collision ,
resulting in a penalty (negative throughput) associated with
such failure. Moreover, assume that the system is capable of
handling multipacket reception (MPR) [26] , i.e. it is possible
to receive several packets simultaneously4. We consider that
the channel has no influence in the loss of any package,
therefore the only option for a failure transmission is due to
collisions with any package over the MPR limit (Kmax + 1).
As it was shown in Example 1 and Figure 1, it is possible to
obtain the maximum utility by controlling the probability of
transmission among the players. This is equivalent to players
choosing to play mixed strategies instead of playing the single
pure strategy. However, as discussed above, they do not have
any incentive to cease transmission to avoid collisions, so, the
expected outcome would be all of them transmitting resulting
in zero throughput. It is shown in [27] that by introducing a
penality to the game it is possible to get closer to the Pareto
optimality. Considering the latter, we propose the following
game models:
A. Poisson game, single type of players
Let us reformulate Example 1 by adding a penalty in the
case of a collision
u(ON, x) =
{
R if x(ON) ≤ Kmax
−αR otherwise ,
u(OFF, x) = 0 ∀x ∈ C,
(9)
where α ≥ 0 is a penalization constant. First, we consider
a multiple access game with N ≥ 2 transmitters (players)
and Kmax = 1. In the case of a collision the transmitter is
penalized by a constant quantity −αR. Figure 4 shows the
4This might be possible by using certain enhancements to the physical
layer such as beamforming in MIMO systems, frequency hopping or multiuser
detection for instance.
5game in strategic form for the case of N = 2. An analogous
game can be found in [9] as an alternative approach to the
distributed coordination function (DCF) in the IEEE 802.11
standard. Each player transmits with probability p following
a mixed strategy policy. Consequently, when the number of
users is known, the multiple access could be cast as a game
with the following utilities:
UOFF,k = 0,
UON,k = p(1− p)
N−1R− αRp[1− (1 − p)N−1]
= (1 − ϑ)[ϑN−1R− αR(1 − ϑN−1)],
(10)
for k = 1, 2, . . .N . Here we make use of the notation ϑ =
1 − p. In order for this game to be in equilibrium we need
to insure, by choosing a proper penalty α, that UOFF,k =
UON,k = 0, ∀k. In other words the following should be true
ϑN−1R = αR(1 − ϑN−1),
ϑ =
(
α
1 + α
) 1
N−1
.
As a result, the mixed strategy in equilibrium given as peq is
achieved by
peq = 1−
(
α
1 + α
) 1
N−1
. (11)
It can be seen that
peq =
{
1 if α = 0
0 if α→∞ . (12)
Notice that for arbitrary N ≥ 2 and α = 0 (i.e. no collision
penalty), peq = 1. This shows, as explained in previous
section, that in general a game without penalty would not
make sense considering that no data can be transmitted at the
equilibrium in pure strategies for N > Kmax. The amount of
data transmitted for a given α > 0 is then
pϑN−1R =
[
1−
(
α
1 + α
) 1
N−1
](
α
1 + α
)
R. (13)
The probability of having a particular player transmitting
successfully is given as
P1,k = p(1− p)
N−1, (14)
hence, the maximum of P1,k can be found by taking the partial
derivative of its logarithm as follows
∂ lnP1,k
∂p
=
1
p
−
N − 1
1− p
= 0,
that results in the unique solution
p =
1
N
, (15)
which is clearly maximum (see also [28]). It follows from eq.
(11), that
1
N
= 1−
(
α
1 + α
) 1
N−1
,
and, therefore
α =
1(
N
N−1
)N−1
− 1
. (16)
If N = 2, the corresponding value of α is
α(2) =
1
2− 1
= 1.
On the other extreme, when N →∞, one can conclude that
α(∞) = lim
N→∞
1(
N
N−1
)N−1
− 1
=
1
e− 1
≈ 0.5
Thus, the range of variation of α is 1
e−1 ≤ α ≤ 1. Since
for smaller N , collisions are frequent, they require a higher
penalty to defer the SUs from continuous transmission. The
case of MPR Kmax > 1 could be treated in a similar fashion
as follows. The probability of transmitting without collision
can be expressed as
P (p)nc =
Kmax∑
k=0
p
(
N − 1
k
)
pk(1− p)N−1−k
=
Kmax∑
k=0
(
N − 1
k
)
pk+1(1 − p)N−1−k
= I1−p(N − 1−Kmax,Kmax + 1),
(17)
where I1−p(a, b) is the incomplete beta function (see [29],
chapter 6) and N > Kmax. For moderately large N , the
binomial distribution of interferers could be considered as
a sum of N − 1 binary random variables. Its distribution
can be very well approximated by a normal random variable
ξ ∼ N (µ, σ2), where
µ = (N − 1)p,
σ2 = (N − 1)p(1− p) = (N − 1)pq.
Therefore,
Pnc ≈ Prob(ξ < K) =∫ Kmax
−∞
1√
2pi(N − 1)pq
exp
(
[x− (N − 1)p]2
2(N − 1)pq
)
dx
≈ Φ
(
Kmax + 0.5− (N − 1)p√
(N − 1)pq
)
, (18)
for large N and not so large Kmax5
Kmax < (N − 1)p. (19)
As the next step, let us maximize the last term in the expansion
in eq. (17) with respect to p,
P ∗nc(p) =
(
N − 1
Kmax
)
pKmax+1(1 − p)N−1−Kmax ,
∂ lnP ∗nc(p)
∂p
=
Kmax + 1
p
−
N − 1−Kmax
1− p
= 0,
(20)
(Kmax + 1)(1− p) = (N − 1−Kmax)p
or
pmax =
Kmax + 1
N
. (21)
5One can assume that Pnc(p) maximum is achieved when p << 1 (or
more accurately p ∼ Kmax/N ).
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Fig. 5. Nash equilibrium for different values of Kmax and N = 20.
This term represents the largest contribution to Pnc given by
eq.(17). Furthermore,(
N−1
Kmax
)
pKmax+1(1− p)N−1−Kmax(
N−1
Kmax−1
)
pKmax(1− p)N−Kmax
=
N −Kmax
Kmax
p
1− p
≈
Np
Kmax
1
1− p
>> 1. (22)
Subsequently, the optimized term provides the bulk contribu-
tion to Pnc. Taking one more term in eq. (17) and following
the same reasoning, it is possible to obtain a very accurate
approximation to the optimum probability of transmission as
Popt ≈
Kmax + 1
Kmax +N
. (23)
Using this value of Pnc we can reformulate eq. (10) as
UOFF,k = 0
UON,k = RPnc(Popt)− αRPc(Popt)
(24)
where Pc = 1 − Pnc stands for the probability of collision.
Therefore, at the equilibrium
UOFF,k = UON,k,
Pnc = αPc
and
α =
Pnc
1− Pnc
∣∣∣∣
p=Popt≈
Kmax+1
Kmax+N
=
∑Kmax
k=0
(
N−1
k
)
(1 − p)N−1−kpk∑N−1
i=Kmax
(
N−1
i
)
(1− p)N−1−ipi
∣∣∣∣∣
p=Popt≈
Kmax+1
Kmax+N
. (25)
It is consistently assumed in all modelled game theory
problems, that the players take decisions based on the most
basic notion of rational play where dominated strategies can
be iteratively eliminated [1]. It is in this sense that the Nash
equilibrium predicts the most likely outcome of the game.
The SUs in this game transmit with a certain probability. If
such probability coincides with the one in equilibrium, then
no player has any incentive to change it. Notwithstanding if
the initial probability of transmission is off from the Nash
equilibrium, the game described in (9) will converge to it and
will be self-sustaining as can be seen in Figure 5.
We consider now that the number of players is a random
variable distributed according to a probability distribution
PN (N). Conditioned on the number of players N , the pay-off
can be rewritten as
UOFF |N = 0,
UON |N = pϑ
N−1R− p(1− ϑN−1)αR,
= pR[(1− α)ϑN−1 − α].
(26)
Averaging over the distribution of N (eq. 4), the unconditional
utilities can be expressed as
UOFF =
∑
UOFF |NPN (N) = 0
UON =
∑
UON |NPN (N) =
pR
[
(1 + α)
∞∑
N=1
ϑN−1PN (N)− α
∞∑
N=1
PN (N)
]
= 0.
(27)
By making use of the following notation
FN (ϑ) =
∞∑
N=1
ϑN−1PN (N), (28)
eq. (27) can be rewritten as
(1 + α)FN (ϑ) = α[1− PN (0)],
or
ϑ = F−1N
[
α
1 + α
(1 − PN (0))
]
, (29)
where F−1N is the inverse function of FN (ϑ). For instance, if
PN (N) = δ(N −N0) N0 > 0, i.e. the game corresponding to
a game with complete information (fixed and known number
of players), then
PN (0) = 0,
FN (ϑ) = ϑ
N0−1,
which coincides with eq. (11). For the Poisson distribution (1)
PN (N) =
λN
N !
e−λ, (30)
one can easily obtain
PN (0) = e
−λ,
FN (ϑ) =
∞∑
N=1
ϑN−1λN
N !
e−λ =
e−λ
ϑ
[exp(ϑλ) − 1] . (31)
Notice that eq. (31) has to be inverted numerically. The
required equation for equilibrium is then
e−λ
ϑ
[exp(ϑλ) − 1] =
α
1 + α
(
1− e−λ
)
,
eϑλ − 1
ϑ
=
α
1 + α
(
eλ − 1
)
.
(32)
If α = 0,
eϑλ − 1
ϑ
= 0,
7does not have solution ϑ = 0 since
lim
ϑ→0
eϑλ − 1
ϑ
= λ 6= 0.
Consider the reduced Poisson distribution where N = 0
is not possible. For the case in which there is a random
number of transmitters trying to access, the question arises:
which penalization α should be chosen in order to obtain
the maximum throughput? We can substitute the optimum
probability of transmission for each player as
Popt ≈
Kmax∑
N=0
1 ·
λN
N !
e−λ +
∞∑
N=Kmax+1
Kmax + 1
Kmax +N
λN
N !
e−λ =
(Kmax + 1) [Γ(Kmax + 1)−KmaxΓ(Kmax,−λ)]
Kmaxeλ(−λ)Kmax
.
(33)
Now for the case when Kmax << λ, the first term in (33) can
be neglected and using asymptotic of Γ(x, a) one obtains the
following approximation
Popt ≈
Kmax + 1
λ+Kmax − 1
. (34)
Accordingly, analogously to eq. (25), we can calculate the
optimal α using the following
α =
∑∞
N=Kmax+1
∑Kmax
k=0
(
N−1
k
)
(1− Popt)N−1−kP kopt
λN
N ! e
−λ∑∞
N=Kmax+1
∑N−1
i=Kmax
(
N−1
i
)
(1 − Popt)N−1−iP iopt
λN
N ! e
−λ
.
(35)
Throughput Analysis
Following the analysis of the MAC with exponential backoff
with MPR [15] [16], we calculate the normalized throughput
as follows. First, we obtain the conditional probability of
having k packets transmitted successfully given that there was
at least one player transmitting in any slot as
P (k)succ =
(
N
k
)
P kopt(1 − Popt)
N−k
PTx
, (36)
where PTx is the probability of having at least one player
transmitting in one slot of time which can be computed as
PTx = 1− (1− Popt)
N .
Therefore, the normalized throughput for the case of a game
with complete information is
T =
Kmax∑
k=1
kP (k)succPTx =
Kmax∑
k=1
k
(
N
k
)
P koptN (1− PoptN )
N−k,
(37)
where PoptN is given by eq. (23). For the case of Poisson
game, eq. (37) becomes
TR =
Kmax−1∑
j=0
λje−λ
(j − 1)!
+
∞∑
n=Kmax
Kmax∑
k=1
k
(
n
k
)
P koptλ(1− Poptλ)
n−k λ
ne−λ
n!
. (38)
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Fig. 6. Throughput comparison between binary exponential backoff scheme
(solid line), game modelled with complete information (dashed line), and
game modeled as a Poisson game (dotted line) for different values of Kmax.
where Poptλ is obtained from eq. (34). In order to assess
the performance of the proposed scheme, we compare the
throughput obtained using Poisson games and the one obtained
from a binary exponential backoff algorithm implemented in
the IEEE 802.11 standard [10]. Standard contention windows
W0 = 16 and W0 = 32 were used for comparison. The results
are shown in Figure 6. In [15] it is shown that as the number
of nodes (players) increases, the throughput converges to a
nonzero constant in all cases (1/2 ln2 for the case of the
binary exponential backoff). The case for the game with com-
plete information is also included. Notice that the throughput
obtained by means of the Poisson game outperforms the one
obtained with the classic exponential backoff for the case of
small number of users. This can be explained by the large size
of the contention window compared with the number of users.
IV. A POISSON GAME WITH TWO TYPES OF PLAYERS
In this section we extend the Poisson game interpretation
of Multiple Access to the case of two types of SU, defined by
different QoS requirements on their rate. For instance, some
users might be using voice services while the rest require a
video streaming service. Within this framework we consider
that type 1 and type 2 players transmit with rate R1 and
R2 respectively. Depending on the QoS for each type of
user, we assume that the maximum number of simultaneous
transmissions supported by users of first type could be no
more than Kmax1 + 1 and the maximum supported by the
second type could be no more than Kmax2 +1. From here the
8corresponding Poisson game can be modelled as
u1(ON, x) =
{
R1 if x(ON) ≤ Kmax1
−αR1 otherwise
,
u1(OFF, x) = 0 ∀x ∈ C,
u2(ON, x) =
{
R2 if x(ON) ≤ Kmax2
−βR2 otherwise
,(39)
u2(OFF, x) = 0 ∀x ∈ C,
where α, β > 0 are the two penalization constants in order
to guarantee the convergence to a Nash equilibrium in mixed
strategies6. Similarly to eq. (24) for the case of a single type
of players, it is possible to write the utilities functions in terms
of the probabilities of non collision and collision as
U
(1)
OFF = 0,
U
(1)
ON (p1, p2) = R1P
(1)
nc (p1, p2)− αR1P
(1)
c (p1, p2),
U
(2)
OFF = 0,
U
(2)
ON (p1, p2) = R2P
(2)
nc (p1, p2)− αR2P
(2)
c (p1, p2).
(40)
Here p1 and p2 are the probabilities of transmission (mixed
strategies) of type 1 and type 2 players respectively. Further-
more, let us just assume, as in the case of single type of
players, that this is a game with complete information with N1
and N2 players of each type respectively. The probability of
non-collision for both types can be found using the following
expressions:
P (1)nc (p1, p2) =
Kmax1∑
j=0
j∑
i=1
(
N1 − 1
i
)(
N2
j − i
)
pi+11 (1− p1)
N1−i−1
× pj−i2 (1− p2)
N2−j+i,
P (2)nc (p1, p2) =
Kmax2∑
j=0
j∑
i=1
(
N2 − 1
i
)(
N1
j − i
)
pi+12 (1− p2)
N2−i−1
× pj−i1 (1− p1)
N1−j+i.
(41)
As it was shown in Example 2, there is a tradeoff in the
choice of p1 and p2. We can see that if p1 is kept fixed and
p2 gets decreased, type 1 players are benefited and viceversa.
Therefore, it is desirable to assign penalties α and β in such
a way that the system works in the boundaries of the Pareto
frontier, i.e. to let all the choices of mixed strategies be Pareto
efficient. The question is how to find such a frontier. We start
from noticing that if N1 = 0 or N2 = 0 the maximum utility
for each type of users is given respectively by eq. (23) when
P (1)nc
(
1 +Kmax1
N1 +Kmax1
, 0
)
or P (2)nc
(
0,
1 +Kmax2
N2 +Kmax2
)
.
In a similar way, using eq. (23) we can see that for the case of
p1 = p2, the maximum probability of non collision for both
utilities is achieved by
P =
1 + K¯max
N1 +N2 + K¯max
, (42)
6Notice that x(ON) is the sum of all transmitting players regardless of
their type.
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where K¯max is the arithmetic mean of Kmax1 and Kmax2 .
Using these three points, one can construct an approximation
to the Pareto frontier by connecting them with straight lines
as shown in Figure 7. Furthermore, analytical approximation
of such frontier as follows.
p2 =


m1p1 +
1+Kmax2
N2+Kmax2
0 ≤ p1 ≤
1+K¯max
N1+N2+K¯max
m2
(
p1 −
1+Kmax1
N1+Kmax1
)
1+K¯max
N1+N2+K¯max
≤ p1 ≤
1+Kmax1
N1+Kmax1(43)
where m1 and m2 are calculated respectively as
m1 =
(
1+K¯max
N1+N2+K¯max
−
1+Kmax2
N2+Kmax2
) (
N1 +N2 + K¯max
)
1 + K¯max
,
m2 = −
1 + K¯max(
N1 +N2 + K¯max
) ( 1+Kmax1
N1+Kmax1
− 1+K¯max
N1+N2+K¯max
) .
(44)
The accuracy of such approximation achieved by eq. (43) is
shown in Figure 7. We compare the approximation calculated
with the Pareto frontier obtained by a simulation using a
genetic algorithm with 30 iterations in Matlab [30]. All
solutions in a Pareto set are equally optimal, so it is up to
the wireless designer to select a solution in that set depending
on the application or the QoS goal. Furthermore, extending
this to the case of a Poisson game, the probability of non
collision for both types can be obtained using the following
equations
P (1)nc =
Kmax1∑
j=0
j∑
i=0
P1(i)P2(j − i),
P (2)nc =
Kmax2∑
j=0
j∑
i=0
P1(j − i)P2(i),
(45)
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where
Pn(x) =
x−1∑
s=0
(rnλ)
s
s!
e−rnλ+
∞∑
l=x
(
l
x
)
pxn(1−pn)
l−x (rnλ)
l
l!
e−rnλ.
(46)
The Pareto frontier for the case of Poisson Games can be
calculated as
p2 =


m1p1 +
1+Kmax2
r2λ+Kmax2−1
0 ≤ p1 ≤
1+K¯max
λ+K¯max
m2
(
p1 −
1+Kmax1
r1λ+Kmax1−1
)
1+K¯max
λ+K¯max
≤ p1 ≤
1+Kmax1
r1λ+Kmax1−1
,
(47)
where m1 and m2 are calculated respectively as
m1 =
(
1+K¯max
λ+K¯max
−
1+Kmax2
r2λ+Kmax2−1
) (
λ+ K¯max
)
1 + K¯max
,
m2 = −
1 + K¯max(
λ+ K¯max
) ( 1+Kmax1
r1λ+Kmax1−1
− 1+K¯max
λ+K¯max
) , (48)
following the same technique as in deriving eqs. (43) and
(44). The Pareto Frontier for the Poisson game with two types
of players is shown in Figure 8. The solid line represents
the utility obtained by using eq. (47) to calculate the mixed
strategies in eq. (45). Consequently, the necessary condition
for the system to be in equilibrium is
U
(1)
OFF = U
(1)
ON (p1, p2) = 0
U
(2)
OFF = U
(2)
ON (p1, p2) = 0
(49)
thus the penalization factor α and β can be respectively
obtained as
α =
P
(1)
nc (p1, p2)
1− P
(1)
nc (p1, p2)
and β = P
(2)
nc (p1, p2)
1− P
(2)
nc (p1, p2)
. (50)
Here p1 and p2 are obtained from the Pareto frontier by means
of eq. (47).
V. GAME MODEL CONSIDERING PRIMARY USER
ACTIVITY
In this section we consider the existence of a single PU
transmitting within the same channel as the SUs. We assume
!"!!
!!
"!
!""!
GOOD
(ON)
BAD
(OFF )
Fig. 9. Primary User Activity
that the PU transmits in a slot by slot basis with probability
PT and that the slots are synchronized between the PU and
the SUs. In this sense, we consider a PU transmitting to be in
an ON state. Let N¯ON be the average number of consecutive
slots in which the PU is in an ON state. Furthermore, let us
observe the PU over ν >> N¯ON sequential time slots. Then,
on average, there will be νPT ON states and therefore the
average number of transitions from OFF to ON state is simply
η
OFF→ON
≈
νPT
N¯ON
. (51)
We assume that all the SUs have perfect detection of the PU
activity, hence when the latter is transmitting, all SUs remain
silent. Let PSU,T be the probability that there is a transmission
from one or more SU when the state of the PU is turned
ON for the first time after being in an OFF state and by
consequence, creating a collision with the PU. The average
number of collisions N¯col is given by
N¯col = PSU,T · ηOFF→ON =
νPTPSU,T
N¯ON
. (52)
Consequently, the average probability of collision between
SUs and the PU is
Pcol,PU =
N¯col
νPT
=
PSU,T
N¯ON
. (53)
For the game with full information, the aforementioned prob-
ability PSU,T represents the probability of having at least one
SU transmitting at the same time as the PU. This can be
calculated as follows
PSU,T (p) = 1− (1− p)
N
. (54)
As an example of the previous, let us assume that the transmis-
sions from a single PU operate in a channel inversion with cut-
off mode [31]. The transmissions follow a Gilbert-Elliot (GE)
model (particularly one which imposes a correlation ρ in the
time domain) [32] [33] where the “GOOD” state occurs with
probability PT and the “BAD” state occurs with probability
1 − PT . In this case, the probability of transmission PT is
directly related to the fading channel as
PT =
∫ ∞
γ0
pγ(γ)dγ (55)
where γ0 is an energy threshold above which a transmission
is possible and pγ(γ) is the fading distribution of the channel.
Within this context, we consider that the PU will transmit in
a slot only within a “GOOD” state and remain silent on the
other case. As it can be seen in Figure 9, we can model the
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dynamic traffic from the PU with r and q defined as follows
[33]
q = PT (1− ρ),
r = (1− PT )(1− ρ),
(56)
where 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1 is the correlation coefficient. The average
duration of the PU in the ON state N¯ON can be calculated as
N¯ON =
∞∑
i=1
i(1− r)i−1r =
1
r
=
1
(1 − PT )(1 − ρ)
. (57)
Let PThcol be a pre-established tolerance threshold defined as
the maximum average probability of collision Pcol,PU the PU
could be able to tolerate. It follows from equation (53) that
PSU,T (p) ≤ N¯ONP
Th
col . (58)
Notice that for PThcol ≥ 1/N¯ON any value of p satisfies eq.
(58). This means that the SUs can transmit with any probability
and just stop transmitting when they detect the presence of a
transmitting PU. On the other hand, when PThcol < 1/N¯ON ,
there is a value p∗ such that
PSU,T (p
∗) = N¯ONP
Th
col , (59)
which can be rewritten as
p∗(N) = 1−
(
1− N¯ONP
Th
col
) 1
N . (60)
If p∗ ≥ Kmax+1
Kmax+N
in eq. (23), the impact to PU can be once
again ignored. Nevertheless, if p∗ < Kmax+1
Kmax+N
, a different value
of Popt needs to be used in order to calculate the penalty α
in eq. (25). Consequently Popt in eq. (23) will be given as
Popt = min
(
p∗(N),
Kmax + 1
Kmax +N
)
. (61)
Considering the analyzed example, one can notice that for
a fixed tolerance PThcol , the SUs can transmit using the op-
timal strategy without significantly affecting the PU if the
latter has very poor channel conditions and/or the channel is
uncorrelated. By extending this analysis to the case of two
types of players, the analogous effect of eq. (61) is to create
a restriction frontier under which the SUs can calculate their
penalization factor α and β by means of equation (50). Such
a frontier can be obtained by rewriting eq. (54) as
PSU,T (p1, p2) = 1−(1−p1)
N1(1−p2)
N2 ≤ N¯ONP
Th
col , (62)
and noticing that the maximum PSU,T for each type of player
that satisfies eq. (62) occurs when either all type 1 SUs
transmit with probability p∗1(N1) and none of the type 2 SUs
transmit (i.e. P (1)SU,T (p∗1(N1), 0)), or, all type 2 SUs transmit
with probability p∗2(N2) and none of the type 1 SUs transmit
(i.e. P (2)SU,T (0, p∗2(N2))). Hence, an accurate approximation
of the restriction frontier can be formed by connecting the
aforementioned two points with a straight line as shown in
Figure 10. It can be seen from the previous that the equality
of such an approximation is very good for the selected values
of parameters. We omit a detailed analysis due to lack of space.
Finally, in order to calculate p∗ for a Poisson game with the
average number of SU denoted as λ, ones has to average eq.
(60) over the Poisson distribution as
p∗(λ) =
∞∑
k=0
p∗(k)
λke−λ
k!
=
∞∑
k=0
{
1−
(
1− N¯ONP
Th
col
) 1
k
} λke−λ
k!
.
(63)
Here p∗(k) can be expanded in terms of a Taylor series with
respect to the number of players k around the average value
λ to produce
p∗(k) = e
ln(1−N¯ONP
Th
col
)
λ − e
ln(1−γ)
λ
ln(1− N¯ONPThcol )(k − λ)
λ2
+O
{
(k − λ)2
}
.
(64)
By taking the first two terms of the latter, we can approximate
the solution of eq. (63) for large λ (as assumed throughout this
paper) as
p∗(λ) ≈ 1−
λeλ − λ− ln
(
1− N¯ONP
Th
col
)
λeλ−ln(1−N¯ONP
Th
col )
. (65)
Therefore Popt in eq. (34) can be obtained simply by
Popt = min
(
p∗(λ),
Kmax + 1
Kmax + λ− 1
)
. (66)
Analogously, for the case of two types of players eq. (62)
becomes
PSU,T (p1, p2) =
∞∑
i=0
∞∑
j=0
{
1− (1− p1)
i(1 − p2)
j
}
×
eλ
(r1λ)
i
i!
(r2λ)
j
j!
≤ N¯ONP
Th
col .
(67)
Thus the restriction frontier can be formed, as seen in the pre-
vious case simply by connecting the two points corresponding
to
P
(1)
SU,T (p
∗
1(r1λ), 0) and P
(2)
SU,T (0, p
∗
2(r2λ)) .
Figure 11 shows the influence of the PU activity on the strategy
choice by SUs in the case of two type of players for different
values of Kmax. It is possible to distinguish three different
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Fig. 11. Restriction Frontier and ParetoFrontier for Poisson Games (λ =
25, N¯ONP
Th
col
= 0.9).
scenarios. In Figure 11(a) one can see that the restriction
frontier lies below the Pareto frontier. This means that the
SUs have to limit their transmission probabilities within the
boundaries of the shown area in order to not significantly
affect the PU performance. On the contrary, in Figure 11(b),
the Pareto frontier is found to be below the restriction fron-
tier. Here, the SUs can choose their strategies based on the
Pareto frontier already calculated with the guarantee that PU’s
performance will remain unaltered and at the same time, the
maximum throughput will be obtained. In Figures 11(c)-(d),
we encounter the case where there is an intersection between
the Pareto frontier and the restriction frontier. Here it can be
observed that the SUs can use any transmission strategy within
the area shown in order to keep the harm provoked to the PU
to the minimum as in previous cases. However, it is always
better to choose strategies which lie on the Pareto frontier
boundaries in contrast to the restriction frontier boundaries in
order to obtain a better throughput to all players.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper presents a game-theoretic perspective on the
secondary users multiple access problem in cognitive radio
networks. In the first part of the paper we have shown how
to design a fixed number of homogeneous SUs game with
penalization. The Nash equilibrium from such a game results
in an optimal throughput of the network per secondary user.
Corresponding analytical expressions have been obtained for
the SU nodes with MPR properties. Furthermore, we have
extended these results to be incorporated into a game with a
random number of players (SUs). The Poisson Games allows
us to account for a dynamically changing situation on the
number of active SUs. An optimal probability of transmission
for the SUs (a mixed strategy) is calculated in order to achieve
the Pareto optimality in the system. The latter was proved
to achieve a better performance for small number of users
than other well known approaches such as the DCF. The
next part of the paper extends the game-theoretic analysis
to the case of two different types of SUs with different
QoS requirements. We showed that the Pareto frontier can
be accurately approximated by means of connecting a piece-
wise function based on the optimal probability of transmission
obtained from each type of players in isolation. Finally, we
have considered the impact of the dynamic activity of the
PU on the SU optimal strategy. It is shown that the optimal
probabilities of transmission for the SUs are influenced by the
PU pattern only under certain conditions. More specifically,
we have derived the conditions for the Pareto frontier under
which the SU activities are limited by either the equilibrium
strategy in games without a PU, by constrains on the SINR of
a PU, or by both in a piece-wise manner. In particular, it was
shown that if the PU has low intermittency in the transmitting
intervals, its affects on the SU strategy could be neglected.
However, for PUs with relatively bursty activities the strategy
of SUs is limited by the SINR requirements at the PU.
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